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The Demise of the 
Revolutionary Imaginary? 
Alessandro Dal Lago 
1. 
A great deal of recent leftist theory is more or less obliquely 
concerned with the sterility of the revolutionary imaginary [im-
maginario rivoluzionario]. The disputes over nihilism, the crises of 
reason and legitimation, and the end of the political demonstrate, 
if nothing else, a gradual realization that this imaginary, which 
was supposed to create alternatives to capitalist society (com-
munism, liberation, the revolution), is bankrupt. The revolution-
ary tradition is now dispersed into fragments which range from 
the so-called culture of narcissism, at one extreme, to "castling" 
to protect orthodox positions at the other, but none of them seem 
to be generating any renewing energies which could use the crisis 
as the starting point of new alternatives [nuove pratiche]. We 
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lamented the embarrassing discovery that we have a few skeletons 
in our closet, or that even a humane or passionate [tropicale] 
socialism doesn't disdain power politics, but we didn't let this 
feeling stimulate any serious reckoning with the revolutionary 
tradition. Some reacted by replacing the crumbling authority of 
Hegel and Marx with that of Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, thinkers 
more up-to-date and less dogmatic, and thus tried to explain, for 
example, that the gulags emanate directly from the perverse imag-
inations of nineteenth-century philosophers. But this move pro-
duced no new philosophy of history, nor even of reason. Then 
there are those who try to improve on the revolutionary tradition 
by immersing themselves rather hastily in areas they traditionally 
scorned: civil rights, the politics and poetics of the body, emotional 
fervor [la calda sfera dei sentimenti]-but this move doesn't seem 
convincing either. It's comforting, then, to see that people are 
again beginning to discuss embarrassing and even slightly un-
realistic issues such as the concept of revolution, without recourse 
to the reigning metaphors of rationality [della razionalita] and lan-
guage games, and without pretending that nothing has changed, 
arrogantly ignoring the fact that this tradition, at least in Italy, 
led to bloodshed and prison, not to a celebration of peace [ballo 
di riconciliazione]. But as we begin to rediscuss the concept of 
revolution, we must recognize that its collapse echoes in a world 
where we are a bit less free, not so much because there are more 
police or because an egalitarian conformism [Z' ossequio democratico] 
is spreading rapidly, but rather because its failure is depriving us 
of some other things which, for good or ill, are connected to it: 
the passion for political inquiry, the habit of recognizing one's 
own lack of freedom. 
What is at stake, then, is not a theoretical choice of new 
models of transition (transition to what?) as much as the possibility 
of preserving critique and opposition to unlivable social structures, 
whatever their updated definition might be. The basic question 
is this: Can we retain the notion of difference (both distance and 
opposition) and thus keep open the possibility of praxis, in spite 
of the fact that this notion is now deprived of either rational or 
historical foundation? It's the problem of political identity, the 
good old-fashioned question of what unites or divides citizens. 
As such it compels us to question the theoretical mechanisms 
which up to now have furnished us with a reassuring response 
to the problems of identity and difference, groups and individuals, 
alliances and conflicts. Take, for example, the mechanism of labor 
value, which produces not only a dubious [discutibile] economic 
theory, but also theories of class, society, politics, and alliances 
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(remember that strange debate over the role of the intellectual?). 
After all, revolutionary discourse is a machine-that is, an artifact 
whose parts interlock and function as a whole but are nonetheless 
individually replaceable. Practically any text demonstrates this : 
one outdated part necessitates a reworking of the whole discourse. 
But this theoretical machine continues to produce something, re-
shaping existing materials; it follows that a serious discussion on 
revolution doesn't have to engage in that old game of patching 
up and making substitutions. (Since the factory proletariat never 
became a general class, we replace it with the new subject, or the 
office worker [l'operaio sociale]; since capitalism doesn't seem to be 
dying, and the state has not been crushed under the workers' 
heel, we introduce the fiscal crisis or the crisis of legitimation.) If 
we're going to engage in a serious discussion of this situation, 
we have to do so from a perspective outside the framework of 
traditional revolutionary discourse. We have to treat the latter as 
we would any other text: examine its parts, trace influences, sepa-
rate its divergent strands, but above all look at its effects. For 
example, it's possible that because we focused exclusively on the 
role of the state and its extinction in world history we have blinded 
ourselves to other power centers, other forms of constraint and 
limitation which are just as determinative and even more preva-
lent. Revolutionary discourse concerns us intimately because until 
recently it provided us with hopeful alternative images, but we 
will have a hard time understanding it today if we don't detach 
ourselves from it, and begin to treat it as a discourse with a history. 
2. 
The fact that we start from the notion of difference already 
implies our detachment from this discourse, but this is no ground 
for fear; we don ' t have to introduce thinkers as complex as 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, or Deleuze yet. Initially, to think starting 
from difference means to stop believing that reality is produced 
by grand mechanisms: that we can, for example, deduce the exis-
tence of an object from its contrary: the subject from the object, 
the society from the state, or the state from the society. We can 
continue to use words like "Dialectic" or "History," but we must 
also realize that they are mere words, not Realities which deter-
mine us . Each of us must speak as his own tiny self, not in the 
name of the Proletariat. Starting from difference means that, yes, 
it's probably true that we are alienated, divided from ourselves, 
and expropriated, but that this is not a condition which necessarily 
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contains its contrary, our liberation, in a potential state: rather, 
this is the condition in which we have to operate, one which will 
not necessarily end. To accept difference means to stop thinking 
in terms of exile and diaspora. Revolutionary discourse is remote 
precisely because its authors speak from absence. In fact, it is 
frequently noted that its core (from Marx and Lenin to Lukacs 
and the various forms of twentieth-century Marxism) is based on 
the idea of recomposition, return, the reconstitution of the differ-
ent separated and alienated subjects, the recapturing of a definitive 
collective identity. In a word, the subject of revolutionary dis-
course suffers the various forms of his division (from himself, 
others, nature, his own labor, etc.) while he is actively awaiting 
[ nell' attesa attiva] his reunification. But if this advent (indepen-
dently of the rhythms, probings, and obstructions which prepare 
it, and of the forms of its fulfillment) constitutes the goal of history, 
then the path that leads to it is the expression of a truth which, 
even if hidden in the various vicissitudes, appearances, and de-
tours of historical contingency, is an immanent, coded one which 
will eventually be unmasked. The moment of recomposition con-
stitutes both the theological nucleus of revolutionary discourse 
and the legitimizing principle of its various converging partial 
truths. The journey to revolution always begins with absence and 
separation in order to move towards epiphany and reconciliation: 
the separated subject moves towards the healing of its own con-
sciousness and a reintegration with its society; separated humanity 
as a species moves towards reunification with nature ("the natural 
is humanized and the human is naturalized"); the proletariat finds 
in its expropriation the condition for beginning its journey to 
reconciliation with the product of its labor and the means of pro-
duction. Furthermore, this movement is concrete and temporal; 
it can be traced and detailed in the development of history, not 
merely on the level of categories. Revolutionary discourse is thus 
a great historical threshing machine which processes events, man-
ufacturing the individual stages of the road to reunification. So 
the discipline [disciplina] of the factory prepares for the conditions 
of its suppression, the utopian prose writers of the nineteenth 
century (both those like Owens who invented a rational admin-
istrative discipline, or mystics of production like Saint-Simon) 
"anticipate" the liberation of labor; classic German philosophy 
meets with French socialism and they engender scientific 
socialism. Depending on which phase or stage is being considered, 
history is the history of those who are either behind, ahead of, 
or in tune with (the classical economists, for example) their particu-
lar stage. This accounts for the profound ambiguity with which 
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revolutionary discourse treats the prominent exponents of a par-
ticular historical phase. This applies to enemies of the workers' 
movement, F. W. Taylor, for example, as well as to those who 
contribute to the development of their particular stage. Thus the 
discipline of the factory is not discussed for what it is in itself (its 
relations with bodies, its properly disciplinary function), but solely 
for its role in the development of communism. This is why revolu-
tionary discourse, which moves away from exile and suffering, 
ends up dragging with it the necessity of alienation and division. 
On the other hand, it is recognized that the road to revolution 
neither conforms to linear time nor starts from voluntaristic uto-
pian schemes, as if history could be abolished overnight by fiat. 
Rather, it is the result of a tension which exists in the nature of 
things, an antagonism which reduces the variety of existence and 
society to an eternal Manichaeism. From the perspective of revo-
lution the historic process works like a machine which fabricates 
oppositions, translating the chaos of experience into clearly defin-
able antagonisms . And it is precisely in this capacity to translate 
diversity and incommensurability into the unity of an opposition 
that the scientific character of revolutionary discourse (or, epis-
temologically speaking, its "rationality") resides. The fascination 
with the modem revolutionary imaginary stems from its power 
to fashion a dialectically ordered unity out of the disorder of experi-
ence. This latent positive power looms over the negative poles of 
the process of unification (today's defeat is the precondition of 
tomorrow's victory, breaking free from capitalism, escaping its 
contradictions, etc.). It's this promise of unity out of diversity 
which gives meaning to the process of revolution, transforming 
what might otherwise be an interminable conflict among its ever 
historically determined yet changeable [ ogni volta storicamente deter-
minati e potenziali] subjects into a tormented revelatioR of truth 
rather than a mere clash of irreconcilable or incommunicative ele-
ments. Its superiority over other eschatologies such as 
evolutionism, with which it has much in common, resides in its 
integration of conflict and flux into a truth-revealing process. Thus 
history advances, ever more advanced forms are spontaneously 
generated, "human anatomy is a key to monkey anatomy." 
3. 
But for som e time now this a priori-type historical progress, 
which legitimizes its own conflictual and yet inevitable truth in 
much the same fashion as does the ontological proof for the exis-
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tence of God, has failed to provide any reasons for action. Not 
only is it illegitimate, pretending to be scientific while refusing to 
tolerate any inquiry into the primitive operations which have made 
it possible, but it is also painfully irrelevant to world events, which 
constantly confound it with troubling questions: Who are the con-
temporary proletarians? Why haven't the various twentieth-cen-
tury revolutions occurred in advanced capitalist countries? What 
happened to the falling rate of profit [la caduta del saggio di profitto ]? 
Why do people have such scant interest in liberation through 
work? Where is the State that has to be abolished? What does 
civil society mean today? These many partial disconfirmations of 
the theory don't mean much; no other type of global discourse is 
any better off with respect to complete truth . It's rather the general 
truth of the discourse as a whole which has been failing to con-
vince, unify, and attract. If it's really necessary to speak of a 
historical process, anyone can see that the latter doesn't gather 
up the empirical manifold into the unity of an opposition, and 
that today more than ever its variety resists formulas such as 
proletariat against the state, the governed against their rulers, 
desire against repression, life against death. If there is a process, 
it seems rather to produce dispersal, multiplications of unsyn-
chronized conflicts, the dissemination of discourses and activities 
which can't be subsumed under a common language. The pro-
letariat does not synthesize the contradictions of youth and 
women; labor does not produce meaning (as the industrial 
psychologists, but not the revolutionaries, know well), much less 
the logic of its suppression; the crisis of capitalism does not pro-
duce crashes [crolli], and much less does its consequent social 
degradation raise consciousness; the subjects of the crisis are not 
unifiable, much less disposed to take on the system . Briefly, we 
don't have to resort to unifying categories or spatial [topologiche] 
metaphors such as deviance or marginality to see that the identities 
traceable in the social processes are separate and incommen-
surable. 
This leads to strange theoretical reversals. Theoreticians such 
as Crozier or Luhmann, who speak on behalf of the system, specu-
late openly about the crisis of democracy or procedural legitima-
tion [la crisi della democrazia o la legittimazione procedurale]; an author 
such as Habermas, who appeals to historical materialism, refuses 
to believe that a state can continue to exist unless there is a certain 
amount of common interest between the rulers and their subjects. 
(Thus the technocrats survey crises and conflicts; the left 
legitimizes the state .) In short, the process produces differences; 
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only those who think they are still living in the days of Louis 
Philippe succeed in finding traces of struggle or raised conscious-
ness. But that's not all. Above and beyond older models such as 
Saint-Simon's productive universe, Sade's or Fourier's oppressive 
game machines, and all the other past utopian projects, intellectual 
and moral reforms, is there anyone who knows what a definitive 
reunification would be, or who would desire it? How, for example, 
would a humanization of nature based on a free development of 
productive forces be able to avoid a total humanization of nature? 
These become meaningless questions the moment one discov-
ers that the answers were already contained within the questions, 
the truths of revolutionary discourse constituting a system of 
Chinese boxes known as dialectic: Who will expropriate the ex-
propriators? The expropriated; or that the various partial truths 
are inscribed one within the other: state and society, conflict and 
process, value and labor, alienation and consciousness. Yet the 
final form of the process of processes, the global truth, is written 
nowhere, or, better, it is contained under various aspects of 
philosophy of history, that neglected chapter of philosophical sci-
ence. If epistemology, which pretends to excise the nonverifiable 
assertions from every discourse, wanted to apply its reductive 
method to revolutionary philosophy of history, it would find that 
the grand tautological/theological agenda [operazione] of revolu-
tionary discourse is an outer shell of meaning and reunification 
which masks an insensitiv~ horror of process and change. This 
point indicates the toughness [durezza] of our position, the depth 
and hiddenness of what we will be able to see if we would only 
bracket the self-proclaimed truth of this discourse and peer over 
the edge of the abyss it screens. Of course, it's really only an 
abyss for those who until just yesterday swore by the inevitability 
of democracy and peace [la marcia fatale della democrazia e della pace] 
or, similarly, by the certain demise of capitalism or the triumph 
of communism. To oppose today's nihilism to yesterday's arrogant 
certainty is, in the best of cases, just philosophical trial-and-error 
[sperimentalismo filosofico]. Instead, recognizing the complete vacu-
ity of the revolutionary imaginary means admitting that we live 
in a difficult world which, though deprived of eschatology, still 
has its own contours and configurations and requires choices. In 
short, it means we must, without a religious recourse to the tra-
ditional imagination's authority, begin using our own imaginary 
to deal with the infinite problems our world poses. 
Yet, from the point of view of imagination, the deflation of 
revolutionary discourse might even reveal itself as an advantage. 
DIFFERENT/A 54 
Considering this discourse as a machine which devours and pro-
duces history, we could check on whether or not it has used 
materials pertinent to other concerns, or whether it hasn't, in fact, 
let other processes and effects slip through on the pretext of melt-
ing them in the final crucible. It's all too easy to get rid of revolu-
tionary discourse, treating it as an excrescence, the monstrous 
excess of a reason which could flow freely without it. Hence 
technocratic and reformist corrections which substitute progress 
for dialectic, socialism for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
autonomy of the political for the myth of the working class, or 
conflictual rationality for dialectical reason, as if the older term, 
trusted in the past, were not made of the same stuff as the new 
one. What if revolutionary discourse, leaving behind the Chris-
tian eschatology of exile and return, has had the effect of locking 
its subjects into a permanently unhappy state of exile, in which 
they await the future (or the revolution, or socialism) with a 
militant sense of guilt, but also with all the arrogance of those 
who know they are invested with grace? In fact, it's precisely this 
combination of grace and guilt, this continual recalling of its own 
public to their duties and, consequently, the representation of a 
moral in a discourse that pretends to be scientific, which never 
fails to amaze us in those who proclaim themselves the subjects 
of the revolutionary process. These criticisms hold not only for 
those who still speak explicitly the language of revolution, but 
even more so for those who, having abandoned its harshest teach-
ings, keep intact the sense of investiture, the mandate to interpret 
historical truth. However, this prophetic arrogance is only the 
most visible aspect of revolutionary discourse. Its most conspicu-
ous effect, even from the cognitive point of view, is its scorn for 
the world, which issues mainly from its conception of history as 
the imminence of the kingdom. I don't mean asceticism, but that 
way of thinking which treats reality as an eternal appearance, or 
the superficial ripples of a stream of truth which will eventually 
see the light. Behavior, facts, events, discourses are not just what 
they are, but are what they mean in the truth machine. Hence 
the passion for depth, the scorn for the surfaces, the obsession 
with authenticity, for the real achievement of the direction of 
history. This holds not only for traditional revolutionary topics: 
the true essence of the state, the authentic proletariat, the real 
meaning of speech or thought in the perspective of history, but 
also for the new ones which surface in the language of those 
would-be post-revolutionaries: the real needs of the masses, au-
thentic interpersonal relations, authentic sexuality, meaning, 
truth. 
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We must, then, begin to reflect on the distraction effect of 
every truth machine which aims to actualize an occult truth: revo-
lutionary discourse, which invites us to disdain our worldly being 
in favor of a return to truth, but also all discourses of transforma-
tion, all change-mechanisms. What is at stake in this reflection is 
simply the restoration of the capacity to see that which exists as 
also unformed, senseless, superficial, and thus to be done with 
that duplication of appearance and reality which makes us scorn 
the former under the illusion that we can ally ourselves with the 
latter. 
